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I. AN INTRODUCTION TO YOUTUBE AND THE DMCA
In today's technologically advanced world, video-sharing
Internet sites ("VSIs"), such as Grouper.com, 1  Bolt.com, 2  and
YouTube.com, 3 provide free, unfettered access to clips of your favorite
television shows and artistic performances, from Animaniacs to ZZ
Top.4 With movie clips viewed over 100 million times each day,
YouTube is the behemoth of these sites 5-a major accomplishment
considering the site entered the video-sharing market in May 2005.6
Two friends, Steve S. Chen and Chad Hurly, created YouTube after
they experienced difficulty posting a video online.7 Taking advantage
of online blogging's popularity, the two distinguished their site by
coupling quick and easy video posting with the ability for site users to
comment on particular clips. 8 Their plan worked, and soon YouTube
was attracting over 15 million viewers per day. 9 The site's popularity
has continued to grow, and now the website receives over 100 million
hits daily. 10 Indeed, YouTube is so popular that Google Inc. ("Google")
purchased the site for $1.65 billion to acquire advertising revenue.11
Although this purchase sent Google's stock soaring, it could ultimately
1. This website currently operates under the name of Crackle. Crackle Home Page,
http://www.grouper.com (last visited Sept. 17, 2007).
2. Bolt.com recently took down its website after plans for a merger with GoFish fell
through. Ellen Lee, Bye-bye Bolt, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 17, 2007, at D1; see Bolt.com Home Page,
http://www.bolt.com ("Please be advised that the operations of Bolt, Inc. and Bolt.com have
ceased."). Earlier this year, Bolt settled a copyright infringement action brought by Universal
Music Group for $10 million. Lee, supra; Caroline McCarthy, RIP Bolt.com: Social Networking
Before We Knew What It Was, CNET NEWS.COM, Aug. 16, 2007, http://www.news.com8301-
135773-9760877-36.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2007).
3. YouTube Home Page, http://www.youtube.com (last visited Sept. 17, 2007).
4. Id. (search for "Animaniacs" or "ZZ Top").
5. Patrick Goldstein, The People's Republic of YouTube, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2006, at El.
YouTube.com alone had over 72.1 million unique visitors in August 2006, compared to 8.1 million
for Bolt.com and 1.8 million for Grouper.com. Universal Music Sues Two Online Video Sites,
REUTERS, Oct. 17, 2006, available at http://www.webtechgeek.com/NEWS/10-17-06fUniversal-
Music-sues-two-online-video-sites.htm.
6. Scott Woolley, Raw and Random, FORBES, Mar. 13, 2006, http://members.forbes.com/
globalI2006/0313/027.html.
7. Id.
8. Jefferson Graham, Video Websites Pop Up, Invite Postings, USA TODAY, Nov. 22, 2005,
at 3B.
9. Woolley, supra note 6.
10. See Goldstein, supra note 5 (discussing YouTube's success and noting that its "video
clips are viewed more than 100 million times each day").
11. David Kirkpatrick & Brent Schlender, The Future of Goo-Tube, FORTUNE, Oct. 30, 2006,
at 32.
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prove to be the company's undoing if it does not thoroughly examine
the legality of YouTube's current and future operational framework. 12
VSIs exist in a gray area of the law, and as such, they are
prone to copyright infringement lawsuits by big-name corporations
and artists, such as Universal Music Group and Sony BMG Music. 13 If
litigated against successfully, VSI owners could be liable for millions,
if not billions, of dollars in damages, effectively putting them out of
business.' 4 So the question arises: Given the current operational
framework of video-sharing Internet sites, are owners of these sites
liable for copyright infringement when copyrighted material is
illegally posted by their users?
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 ("DMCA")
primarily governs this issue. 15 This Act, established to prevent the
problem of online copyright infringement, contains "safe harbor"
provisions that protect Internet service providers ("ISPs") from
liability if they meet certain criteria. 16 Specifically, § 512 of the Act
precludes ISP liability as long as the ISP (1) adopts and implements a
policy to remove repeat infringers, (2) informs users of this policy, (3)
accommodates and does not interfere with "standard technical
measures" used to protect copyright holders, and (4) meets the
additional activity-specific requirements parsed out in the remaining
subsections. 17 For VSIs such as YouTube, which allow third-party
users to store information on their systems at the users' election, this
fourth prong requires that that the ISP (1) not have actual or
12. One week after purchasing YouTube.com, Google's stock increased $33.61 to $459.67 a
share. Jefferson Graham, Google Profit Rockets on "Very, Very Good' Business; Analyst Calls
Search Giant's Quarter "Amazing, USA TODAY, Oct. 20, 2006, at lB. Graham also notes that
"Internet analysts say Google could potentially be liable for expensive lawsuits from companies
concerned about copyright infringement on YouTube. But [Google CEO] Schmidt said he has no
such concerns." Id.
13. In fact, Universal filed lawsuits against Grouper.com and Bolt.com on October 9, 2006
alleging copyright infringement for "allowing users to swap pirated versions of its musicians'
videos." Universal Music Sues Two Online Video Sites, supra note 5.
14. Universal sought up to $150,000 plus costs for each successful claim of copyright
infringement by Grouper.com and Bolt.com, resulting in millions of dollars of damages. Id.
Indeed, the Bolt.com suit recently settled for $10 million. McCarthy, supra note 2. Viacom has
also recently brought forth an infringement action, this one against YouTube, claiming $1 billion
in damages. Google Slams 'Sabotage Bid' by Viacom, EVENING STANDARD (London), May 1, 2007.
15. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998)
(codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
16. See Stephen A. Hess, Minesweeping the Digital Millennium Copyright Act "Safe
Harbors," 33 COLO. LAW. 95, 95 (2004) (explaining the background of § 512 and stating that
"[t]he 'safe harbors' set forth in § 512 exempt service providers from liability for copyright
violations"); see also 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2007) (explaining the statutory criteria required for ISPs).
17. These requirements vary according to the activities in which the ISP engages. 17 U.S.C.
§ 512(a)-(d), (i).
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apparent knowledge of infringing activity, (2) not receive a direct
financial benefit related to the infringing activity when the ISP has
the right and ability to control its users' actions, and (3) upon notice of
infringing material or activity, "expeditiously" remove the infringing
material.18 Many commentators have suggested that even though
YouTube and other video-sharing sites implement policies to remove
repeat infringers, inform their users of these policies, and remove
copyrighted material upon notification by the copyright owner, the
VSIs may still be liable for infringement.19
YouTube's potential liability is far from evident, however,
because § 512 of the DMCA has not been thoroughly litigated and
there is a paucity of case law interpreting its provisions.
Consequently, as litigation proceeds in this area, courts could
interpret the ambiguous language of this section in different ways.
Two areas of the statute appear particularly ripe for litigation. First,
ISPs are protected from litigation only if they are "[un]aware of facts
or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent."20 Second,
protection does not extend to ISPs who "receive a financial benefit
directly attributable to the infringing activity."21 Depending on
judicial interpretation of these phrases, VSIs could fall outside the
ambit of the DMCA's safe harbor provisions. In fact, based on the
current operational structures of these sites, it is possible that they
have already breached the liability protection requirements and are no
longer as safe from liability as they claim.
This Note examines YouTube's current position under the
DMCA to determine whether VSIs are safe from liability under the
Act's safe harbor provisions. With litigation on the horizon, 22
answering this question is critical to determining the continuing
viability of these popular sites. Part II of this Note discusses
YouTube's current business framework under Google's command, the
history of the DMCA, and the safe harbor provisions' applicability to
YouTube. Part III analyzes the most common interpretations of these
safe harbor provisions as applied to VSIs and discusses the likely
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., Declan McCullagh & Anne Broache, YouTube May Add to Google's Copyright
Worries, CNET NEWS.COM, Oct. 9, 2006, http://news.com.comlYouTube+may+add+to+Googles
+copyright+worries/2100-1030 3-6124149.html (discussing how § 512 is "murky," making it
unclear whether YouTube is safe from liability).
20. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii).
21. Id. § 512(c)(1)(B).
22. See McCullagh & Broache, supra note 19 (discussing the fact that YouTube is currently
in litigation for copyright infringement-one of many, some predict, unless YouTube changes its
policies).
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outcome of an infringement action brought against YouTube or a
similar entity. Finally, Part IV offers systematic changes that VSIs
can enact to better protect themselves against liability arising from
infringement actions and proposes a legislative solution that better
aligns the interests of VSIs with the artists and corporations that own
the copyrighted material.
II. COPYRIGHT LAW, THE DMCA, AND THE CREATION OF YoUTUBE AS A
WORLD-WIDE PHENOMENON
A. The Origins of YouTube in a Digital Age
Just a few years ago, it was impractical to post video clips on
websites, let alone share those clips with others freely and easily. 23
Photo-sharing websites were increasingly available, due in large part
to the popularity of digital cameras, but video-sharing websites
remained infeasible.24 That quickly changed, however, as digital
cameras became smaller and better at capturing video, and their
associated video files became smaller and more easily transmitted,
thereby increasing the demand for online video-sharing sites. 26
Simultaneously, broadband access increased dramatically, allowing
users to connect to the Internet and to view and upload larger files,
including videos, more quickly than ever before. 26 As demand and
connection speeds increased, a greater number of sites came online,
and soon there were many sites competing to acquire the largest user
base.2 7
YouTube entered the VSI market against this backdrop and
quickly became one of the most popular sites on the Internet.28
YouTube distinguished itself from other VSIs by making it easier to
post videos online. Unlike some older VSIs that required users to
download file-transfer software, supply information about the file
23. See Graham, supra note 8 (stating how one year ago, to post a video clip online free of
charge one had to have knowledge of "computer code and [be] willing to post it on a personal
website").
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. One study reports that from December 2000 to August 2003, broadband access among
U.S. Internet users increased from 6% to about 30%. MARY MADDEN ET AL., AMERICA'S ONLINE
PURSUITS: THE CHANGING PICTURE OF WHO'S ONLINE AND WHAT THEY DO 5 (Lee Rainie ed.,
2003), http://www.pewInternet.org/pdfs/PIPOnlinePursuits-Final.pdf.
27. Graham, supra note 8.
28. Goldstein, supra note 5.
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being uploaded, and obtain approval by the company before posting, 29
a YouTube user merely has to sign in, enter the name of the file, and
click "upload." YouTube employees then scan the uploaded files for
inappropriate content, such as pornography, excessive violence, or
hate-crime footage videos. Still, YouTube has not yet employed a
system to spot copyrighted works.3 0
The company has, however, taken steps to protect itself from
any possible legal claims. First, after acquiring YouTube, Google
immediately cut licensing deals with large media companies, such as
Universal Music Group and Sony BMG Music. 31 In exchange for a
share of advertising revenue, these media companies have authorized
YouTube users to upload videos containing copyrighted works or
pieces of these works. 32 Second, YouTube has a termination policy in
place for repeat copyright infringers. 33  Third, YouTube will
immediately remove any videos when notified by the copyright owner
that copyrighted files reside on the website. 34 Finally, the company
plans to implement self-automated technology designed to detect
copyrighted material. 35 The program will scan all of YouTube's movies
using an "audio-signature technology that can spot a low-quality copy
of a licensed music video or other content."36 The company, however,
will not delete the tagged files automatically. 37 Instead, the program
will help copyright owners locate and identify their content, allowing
them to decide what course to take.38
Even with these precautionary measures in place, it is unclear
whether YouTube will insulate itself from copyright infringement
29. Google Video, a video sharing Internet site created by Google prior to its purchase of
YouTube, is one such example. Graham, supra note 8.
30. YouTube currently uses software that can identify pornographic videos, and has a staff
in place to remove videos flagged by YouTube users as "objectionable." Woolley, supra note 6.
31. YouTube Strikes Content Deals, USA TODAY, Oct. 9, 2006, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2006-10-09-youtube-dealsx.htm.
32. Id.
33. Just a few months ago, after being notified by a series of Japanese companies that more
than 30,000 videos on YouTube were infringing copyrights, YouTube immediately removed them.
Mark Schilling, Japan Org Warns YouTube, DAILY VARIETY, Dec. 7, 2006, at 30. YouTube also
plans on removing over 100,000 clips owned by Viacom. Catherine Holahan, Viacom's High-
Stakes Duel with Google, BUS. WK., Feb. 2, 2007, available at http://www.businessweek.
com/technology/content/feb2007/tc20070202-568443.htm?chan=top+news-top+news+index-busi
nessweek+exclusives.
34. See, e.g., Schilling, supra note 33 (stating that YouTube removed infringing files when
asked to do so by Japanese companies, but that the problem persisted).
35. Alex Veiga, Rise of a Copyright Auto-Cop, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 22, 2006, at E06.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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liability. First, YouTube is home to many video clips that use
copyrighted material in ways that may be difficult for automatic scans
to detect. 39 Second, YouTube hosts many clips, including rare and
amateur videos, that contain copyrighted material owned by small,
unknown artists or single individuals, as opposed to the mega-music
and video companies with which Google is acquiring licenses. 40 Third,
Google's lofty aspirations for YouTube may increase the site's
vulnerability to liability. Not only has Google begun to advertise
heavily on the site, but also it plans to increase its advertising in the
future, as it grooms YouTube to become television's successor.41 Thus,
the site may remain open to massive liability if it is not protected
under the DMCA.
B. Copyright Law Prior to the DMCA
For more than a quarter of a century, U.S. copyright law has
been governed largely by the United States Copyright Act of 1976
("the Copyright Act"). 42 This act, under § 106, grants copyright owners
a series of exclusive rights, including the rights to reproduce a
copyrighted work, prepare derivative works, distribute copies, and
perform or display a work publicly. 43 An individual who violates any of
these exclusive rights, either directly or indirectly, 44 is deemed a
copyright infringer and is subject to a host of remedial actions,
including injunctions, statutory damages, and possibly even
imprisonment. 45
39. For example, clips to 'The Office" can be accessed through searching by the characters'
or actors' names, or even by the song connected to the video montage, which makes uncovering
copyrighted materials more difficult. E.g., YouTube Home Page, supra note 3 (search for "Jim
and Pam," "John Krasinski," or "You're My Best Friend") (last visited Sept. 17, 2007).
40. Ben Ratliff, A New Trove of Music Video in the Web's Wild World, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3,
2006, at El.
41. See Justin Berton, That Soft Blue Glow at Night May Not Be a TV Anymore, S.F.
CHRON., Nov. 5, 2006, at Al (discussing the fact that online viewing may be the future of
television, with Google the first step as the provider of such content by purchasing YouTube).
42. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (effective Jan. 1, 1978).
43. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2007). See Lucy H. Holmes, Making Waves in Statutory Safe Harbors:
Reevaluating Internet Service Providers' Liability for Third-Party Content and Copyright
Infringement, 7 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 215, 227-28 (2001) (discussing the rights granted in
§ 106, and the three theories of liability associated with it-direct liability, contributory
infringement, and vicarious liability).
44. See Pickholtz v. Rainbow Techs., Inc., 260 F. Supp. 2d 980, 989-90 (N.D. Cal. 2003)
(discussing the distinction between direct and indirect infringement and claiming that action
under one theory excludes the other if based on the same act).
45. 17 U.S.C. §§ 107, 501-06.
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To directly infringe, one must copy, either willfully or
inadvertently, "protected elements" of a copyrighted work. 46 These
elements include those aspects of a copyrighted work that are original
(e.g., owing their origin to the author) and that show "a minimal
degree of creativity."47 A creator demonstrates a possible infringer's
lack of "minimal creativity" via evidence of direct copying or evidence
(1) that the defendant had "access" to the work in question and (2)
that his work was "substantially similar" to that of the plaintiff.48
To indirectly infringe, one must be either a contributory
infringer or vicariously liable for the acts of a direct infringer.49 A
contributory infringer is someone who substantially aids a direct
infringer with knowledge of the infringing activity.50 For example, a
store owner may be liable as a contributory infringer if one of her
employees sells illegal copies of copyrighted materials with the
owner's knowledge. This 'is because the owner, by providing his
employees with the actual business location, substantially participates
in the infringing activity. 5' A vicariously liable entity, on the other
hand, "has the right and ability to control the infringer's acts and...
receives a direct financial benefit from the infringement."52 For
example, in a Seventh Circuit case, a dance club owner who hired a
singer was found vicariously liable for the singer's performance of
copyrighted works. 53 The court justified liability because the club
owner had the ability to fire the singer as soon as she began singing
copyrighted material, and he arguably received a direct financial
benefit (in the form of more patrons coming to the club) for the singer's
performance of the copyrighted work. 54
Even if one directly or indirectly infringes, he can still avoid
liability if the infringement constitutes a "fair use" of the copyright
owner's work. As will be discussed in detail below, a court balances
46. Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 481 (9th Cir. 2000).
47. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
48. Three Boys Music Corp., 212 F.3d at 481.
49. Although there is no statutory rule on indirect infringement, courts have accepted
these common law theories to implement liability. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-
Line Commc'n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1373 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (accepting these theories of
liability).
50. Id. at 1373-75.
51. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that
a flea market owner was liable for contributory infringement when he had knowledge of
infringing activity going on because he provided the infringer, his booth operator, with the
advertising, plumbing, parking, etc. that he needed to get patrons).
52. Religious Tech. Ctr., 907 F. Supp. at 1375.
53. Dreamland Ball Room, Inc. v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354, 355 (7th Cir. 1929).
54. Id. (holding the owner liable because the music was being played "for the profit of the
proprietor of the dance hall").
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four factors in order to decide whether a certain use of a copyrighted
material constitutes a fair use: (1) the transformativity of the work, (2)
the nature of the copyrighted work, (3) the amount of work copied, and
(4) the potential market effect of the infringement. 55 If the court
decides that such infringement was "fair," then no liability will attach
to the infringer.
These legal concepts seemed appropriate for most media until
the advent of the Internet. 56 Indeed, "[t]he Net raise[d] many new
questions to vex traditional concepts of who is responsible" for
copyright infringement. 57 Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena first
applied these principals in the Internet setting.5 In that case, the
defendant, Frena, owned and operated an online "bulletin-board"
service ("BBS") (the forerunner to ISPs) where his subscribers could
upload, view, and download photographs. 59 One of his subscribers
uploaded more than one hundred photographs owned by Playboy
without the company's authorization or permission.6 0 Playboy then
sued the defendant, who, upon notification of the alleged infringing
material, deleted the photographs from the BBS.61 The court held that
Frena violated Playboy's copyright on the images, despite the fact that
he did not actually copy or upload the photographs, because the
defendant, through providing the bulletin board service, violated the
plaintiffs' public distribution and display rights under § 106.62 The
court failed to realize that Frena was not actually distributing
material embodiments of plaintiffs work, but rather was providing a
service allowing users to complete the actual distribution.6 3 Nor did
the court discuss whether Frena himself, as opposed to his
subscribers, was responsible for displaying the copies.64 As such, this
case left copyright law in the Internet context largely unsettled.
A few years later, in Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-
Line Communication Services, Inc., the court attempted to clarify the
55. See infra Part III.A.4 (discussing the fair use defense).
56. One exception is telephone companies and other service providers that provided "wires,"
which allowed for the transmission of copies. Congress protected the wire providers by passing a
"passive carrier" exemption. 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
12B.01 (2006).
57. Id.
58. 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
59. Id. at 1554.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1556-57.
63. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 56.
64. Id.
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legal responsibilities of ISPs.65 In Netcom, Dennis Erlich, a former
Scientology minister, posted both published and unpublished writings
owned by the Church of Scientology on an online forum accessed via a
BBS that used Netcom's services to connect to the Internet. 66 To post a
message, Erlich transmitted messages to the online BBS through his
modem. 67 Netcom's software then automatically copied the message
onto its own computer and others without any input from Netcom
personnel.68 The court found that Netcom was not directly liable for
infringement because it had not "initiated the copying" and therefore
did not "cause" the copying.6 9 The court remarked, however, that
Netcom may be liable for contributory infringement because it
received a letter from the plaintiffs stating that Erlich was posting
copyrighted material without permission and therefore had knowledge
of the infringement, but took no action to remove the posts.7 0
About the time that Frena was decided, Congress met to
discuss the future of U.S. copyright law. 71 In 1993, Congress created a
Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights to "investigate the
effects of emerging digital technology on intellectual property rights
and make recommendations on any appropriate changes to U.S.
intellectual property law and policy."72 In 1995, the Working Group
finished its report (known as the "White Paper") suggesting that
Congress apply existing copyright law broadly to digital transmissions
and to the Internet in general. 73 The report also recommended that
Congress adopt laws strongly protecting the copyrights of digital
works in order to realize the Internet's full potential. 74 Many groups,
especially ISPs, criticized this view, claiming that increased regulation
would hinder technological innovation, and they negotiated with
Congress to obtain favorable laws. 75 Influenced by these negotiations,
65. 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
66. Id. at 1365-66.
67. Id. at 1367.
68. Id.
69. In fact, the court compared Netcom's copying to that of the owner of a copying machine
who lets the public use the machine to make copies. Id. at 1368-69. Note that although causation
is not an element required to show a prima facie case of copyright infringement, the court was
stretching here to find a method to protect the BBS so that BBSs in general would be able to
operate without fear of infringement.
70. Id. at 1374.
71. "The process to update U.S. copyright law with respect to digital transmissions began in
February, 1993." S. REP. No. 105-190, at 2 (1998).
72. Id.
73. RALPH S. BROWN & ROBERT C. DENICOLA, COPYRIGHT 463-64 (9th ed. 2005).
74. Id.
75. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 56 (mentioning how "representatives of content
owners met at length with representatives of service providers in an attempt to formulate new
1568 [Vol. 60:5:1559
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as well as the Netcom decision, Congress ultimately developed and
adopted the DMCA in 1998.76
C. The DMCA: A Safe Harbor for ISPs
With the passage of the DMCA, Congress intended to strike a
balance between encouraging experimental technology and protecting
copyright holders from infringement online. 77 Congress thus decided to
"leave current law in its evolving state," but to add to this law a series
of "safe harbor" provisions providing ISPs with limited liability in
certain circumstances. 78 As a result, the common law principles
developed in Frena, Netcom, and successive cases remain important in
determining if and when an ISP is a copyright infringer. 79 It is also
imperative to understand the safe harbor provisions provided in the
DMCA in order to grasp the potential liability of an ISP charged with
copyright infringement.
To be eligible for safe harbor protection, ISPs must meet three
threshold eligibility requirements. First, a service provider must
"adopt[ ] and reasonably implement[ I" a termination policy for repeat
infringers.80 Second, the ISP must "inform subscribers" that such a
termination policy exists.81 Third, the ISP must "accommodate and...
not interfere with standard technical measures" used by copyright
owners to protect or track their own works.8 2
standards to govern this domain" and how initial lack of agreement between the two sides stalled
legislation in Congress).
76. Indeed, the House Judiciary Committee report stated that the DMCA:
[E]ssentially codifies the result in the leading and most thoughtful judicial decision
to date: Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-line Communications Services,
Inc. In doing so, it overrules those aspects of Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena,
insofar as that case suggests that such acts by service providers could constitute
direct infringement, and provides certainty that Netcom and its progeny, so far only
a few district court cases, will be the law of the land.
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 1, at 11 (1998) (citations omitted)).
77. See Mike Scott, Note, Safe Harbors Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 9
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POLY 99, 99 (2006) (noting that "Congress recognized that this legal
foundation needed to strike a delicate balance" between online service providers and copyright
holders) (citing S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 21, 69 (1998); H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 21, 24-26,
58-59)).
78. S. REP. No. 105-190, at 19.
79. "Section 512 is not intended to imply that a service provider is or is not liable as an
infringer. . . . [T]he limitations of liability apply if the provider is found to be liable under
existing principles of law." Id.
80. Termination is only required under "appropriate circumstances." 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)
(2007).
81. Id.
82. These measures must also have been developed broadly by many different copyright
owners, be available to all, and not impose substantial burdens or costs on the ISPs. Id.
2007] 1569
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Once these threshold requirements are met, the DMCA
provides ISPs with liability protection if the ISP is involved in at least
one of four stated activities. First, the DMCA protects ISPs from
liability for copyright infringement occurring by way of an ISP
"transmitting, routing, or providing connections for" copyrighted
material or the "transient" storage of such material.83 Second, the
DMCA provides protection from copyright infringement for infringing
material stored "on a system or network controlled" by the ISP.8 4
Third, and most importantly for YouTube and other VSIs, the DMCA
provides protection against copyright infringement for storing a
copyrighted work "at the direction of a user of material that resides on
a system or network controlled ... [by] the service provider."8 5 Finally,
protection extends to a provider who links its users to an "online
location containing infringing material" by using a hyperlink, pointer,
reference, or other online tool.8 6 Each activity has a corresponding set
of additional requirements an ISP must satisfy before protection is
awarded.
Although these conditions seem straightforward, the general
language used throughout the Act leaves them open to multiple
interpretations-especially because there has been little litigation
over these provisions. For example, when is a termination policy
"reasonably implemented"? Will any termination policy satisfy the
requirement? What exactly are "standard technical measures" in a
practical setting? When is a financial benefit directly attributable to
infringing activity? These questions must be answered to determine if
83. Providers are protected so long as they are not responsible for initiating the
transmission, the transmission is carried out by an automatic process, they do not select who
receives the material, they do not allow the copies made to be accessible to anyone else, and the
copied material is not modified in any way. Id. § 512(a). This provision is meant to protect ISPs
such as AOL or NetZero, which provide users with access and connection to the internet.
84. Protection is granted so long as the provider is not responsible for posting the material
online, the person who posted the material directs who is to receive the material, and the
material is stored through an automated process. Id. § 512(b). This provision is meant to protect
ISPs'such as Yahoo, Google, and other search engines, which use software to automatically cache
copies of websites for easier searching. See Parker v. Google, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 492, 498 (E.D.
Pa. 2006) (holding that Google was safe under § 512(b) for caching copies of websites for its
search engine).
85. This protection extends so long as the service provider does not know that the material
is infringing or is unaware of facts or circumstances that would suggest it was infringing, does
not "receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity," and, upon notice
of infringing activity, "expeditiously" removes such infringing material from the site. 17 U.S.C.
§ 512(c).
86. Protection extends so long as the provider does not have actual knowledge of the
infringing material, does not receive a financial benefit from the infringing activity, and, upon
notification, removes the infringing material. Id. § 512(d).
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YouTube and other VSIs can avoid liability. As the following analysis
suggests, YouTube may be entering dangerous territory.
III. OPENING YOUTUBE TO POTENTIAL LIABILITY VIA THEORIES OF
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
A. YouTube's Liability Absent the Safe Harbor
As discussed in detail below, absent the DMCA's safe harbor,
VSIs such as YouTube likely would be liable for copyright
infringement under the theory of vicarious liability and perhaps under
contributory infringement, but probably would not be liable for direct
infringement. The first step in analyzing potential liability involves
examining VSI liability in the absence of safe harbors, which will be
discussed in this section. Sub-sections A1-A4 will discuss each theory
of copyright liability mentioned above, as well as any possible fair use
defense YouTube would have absent the DMCA. Thereafter,
determining whether VSIs meet the requirements for safe harbor
protection is imperative to deciding whether they would face liability
for copyright infringement. This issue will be discussed in Section B of
this Part.
1. Direct Liability
Even absent the protection afforded by the safe harbor
provisions, YouTube and other VSIs likely would not be liable for
direct copyright infringement. Before the DMCA's passage, two
competing judicial ideologies governed whether ISPs could be directly
liable for the activities of their users. One, expressed by the Middle
District of Florida in Frena, held that ISPs could be direct infringers if
there was ownership of the copyright, copying, and a violation of one
of the exclusive rights in § 106 of the Copyright Act, even if the
defendant was not the one who created the copy.87 The court expressly
stated that "[t]here is no dispute that Defendant Frena supplied a
product containing unauthorized copies of a copyrighted work. It does
not matter that Defendant Frena claims he did not make the copies
itself [sic]."88
Under this interpretation, it is highly likely that, absent the
DMCA, YouTube and other VSIs would be liable as direct infringers.
87. Playboy Enters. Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1555-59 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
88. Id. at 1556; see supra text accompanying notes 58-64 (stating the facts of Frena).
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To begin with, the copies of copyrighted videos located on the VSIs are
usually exact copies of work owned by someone else.8 9 Thus, for a large
majority of these videos, there is no doubt that copying has occurred,
the works are substantially similar, and there is ownership of a
copyright. These elements satisfy the basic requirements of
infringement. 90 Just as Frena did not manually copy the photographs,
the VSIs do not manually copy the videos in question; rather, an
automated process creates the copies when a copyrighted work is
uploaded by a user. Once uploaded, these videos can be viewed,
although not downloaded, by millions of people. 91 Consequently, it is
clear that the VSIs, under Frena, breach the owner's right to publicly
display the copyrighted works and therefore would be liable for direct
infringement. Thankfully for VSIs, however, the majority of courts do
not adhere to this view.
The other, more widely followed view, exemplified in Netcom,
would exempt the VSIs from direct infringement liability under
current circumstances. 92 Recall in Netcom that one of the defendant's
users posted unpublished, copyrighted manuscripts on the defendant's
BBS.93 Just as in Frena, the defendant did not carry out the actual
copying; rather, the copies were created via an automated process
when the user uploaded the files to the server. 94 However, unlike the
Frena court, the Netcom court held that the defendant was not liable
for direct infringement, despite making substantially similar copies
and publicly displaying them on the BBS.95 The court stated that
because the defendant "did not take any affirmative action that
directly resulted in copying plaintiffs' works," other than having an
automated system that created temporary copies, the defendant did
not actually initiate the copying and therefore could not be liable as a
direct infringer. 96 These automated actions were "necessary to having
a working system for transmitting Usenet postings to and from the
89. Although YouTube limits videos to ten minutes in length, many individuals get around
this requirement by posting copyrighted material in ten-minute installments. Google Quizzed
over YouTube Plans, BBC NEWS, Oct. 26, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uklgo/pr/fr/-/lhi/uk-politics/
6087976.stm.
90. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991) (explaining the
requirements for infringement).
91. See Goldstein, supra note 5 (noting that clips are viewed over 100 million times daily).
92. Indeed, this view has been followed by the Fourth Circuit. See ALS Scan, Inc. v.
RemarQ Cmtys., Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 622 (4th Cir. 2001).
93. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1365-
66 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
94. Id. at 1367-68.
95. Id. at 1383.
96. Id. at 1368-69.
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Internet," and as such, the defendant's actions lacked "causation" as to
the direct infringement. 97 Thus, the court concluded, the defendant
could not be held liable as a direct infringer.
Under this view, it is clear that VSIs like YouTube would be
free from liability as direct infringers. Just as third parties were
responsible for posting the Scientology manuscripts in Netcom, third
parties post the videos in question. More importantly, just as in
Netcom, the copies created by the VSIs are made via an automated
process initiated by the third-party user. To share videos online, such
an automated process is necessary, and thus, it is imperative that
service providers be offered some protection for copyrighted videos
that they themselves did not copy. Therefore, under this view, VSIs
are not direct infringers absent DMCA protection. Given that
Congress accepted this view over Frena's when it adopted the
DMCA,98 it is likely that the Netcom interpretation of direct liability
for ISPs would control absent DMCA protection, and therefore, it is
likely that VSIs would not be held liable as direct infringers if the safe
harbor provisions were deemed inapplicable.
2. Vicarious Liability
Despite the fact that YouTube and other VSIs likely would not
face direct infringement liability, it is highly likely that these sites
would be liable under the theory of vicarious liability. Vicarious
liability is a relatively recent creation, although its roots are grounded
in the much earlier tort-and-agency-law concept of respondeat
superior.99 Unlike the theory of respondeat superior, the theory of
vicarious liability extends past the employee-employer relationship.
As stated by the Second Circuit in Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L.
Green Co., to prove vicarious liability for copyright infringement a
plaintiff need only show that there was a direct infringer, that the
defendant gained a direct financial benefit from the copier's
infringement, and that the defendant had the right and the ability to
control the direct infringer.100 The defendant need not have knowledge
of the direct infringer's actual infringement. 10 1 In Shapiro, the
97. Id. at 1368-70.
98. See supra note 76 (quoting the House Judiciary Committee that the DMCA was meant
to overrule Frena in many respects).
99. See Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963)
(extending the normal agency rule of respondeat superior to copyright situations "[w]hen the
right and ability to supervise coalesce with an obvious and direct financial interest in the
exploitation of copyrighted materials").
100. Id.
101. Id.
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defendant, H.L. Green Company, was held liable for vicarious liability
when one of its licensees, Jalen Amusement Company, sold illegally
copied records to customers in its store. 102 Because H.L. Green
received a ten-to-twelve percent commission from the sales made in
Jalen's stores and had a continuous relationship with Jalen via the
license (indeed, the company had "unreviewable discretion" to fire any
of Jalen's employees deemed to be acting improperly), the court held
H.L. Green liable for copyright infringement, having received a direct
financial benefit from the infringement and having the right and
ability to control Jalen and its employees through the license
agreement.103
Just as H.L. Green was found liable for infringement via
vicarious liability, YouTube and other VSIs, as they currently and
prospectively operate, could be vicariously liable for copyright
infringement absent safe harbor protection. Currently, a majority of
VSIs post advertisements on their websites to garner revenue. 10 4 It is
conceivable that given these sites' large audiences, posting an ad
would be expensive. In addition, it is likely that as the number of
users increases over time, the fee for advertising will increase
proportionately. Assuming that users are drawn to these VSIs because
they can access free copyrighted material, 10 5 there is a direct financial
benefit attributable to VSIs based on the amount of infringing
material on their sites. In short, the more copyrighted files the sites
contain for viewing, the more users such a site will draw, and
therefore, the more the VSI can charge for advertising. As such, it is
highly likely that a court would find that VSIs are receiving a direct
financial benefit from the infringing material under these
circumstances. 106
It is also likely, though admittedly less clear, that a court
would determine that YouTube has "the right and ability to control"'10 7
its users' behavior and therefore would hold YouTube vicariously
liable absent safe harbor protection. Although the Ninth Circuit in
A&M Records v. Napster, Inc. held that "[t]he ability to block
102. Id. at 307-09.
103. Id. at 306-09.
104. See, e.g., YouTube Home Page, supra note 3; Crackle Home Page,
http://www.crackle.com (last visited Sept. 25, 2007).
105. See Google Quizzed over YouTube Plans, supra note 89 (noting that "video-sharing
website's rapid growth has been partly down to the thousands of clips from old TV shows
uploaded illegally by its users").
106. In MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, the Supreme Court suggested that a similar business
model "confirm[ed] that [Grokster's] principle object was use of [its] software to download
copyrighted works." 545 U.S. 913, 926 (2005).
107. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963).
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infringers' access to a particular environment for any reason
whatsoever is evidence of the right and ability to supervise,"'08 many
other courts have suggested that this is only an accurate statement of
the law when dealing with a "closed-universe system" search engine
like Napster. 10 9 Recently, a California district court held that even
though Google had the ability to de-link certain infringing images
retrieved through its image search, the fact that Google operated in an
open, web-based system where "remov[ing] a link from its search
index d[id] not render the linked-to site inaccessible" meant that
Google did not have "substantial input into or authority over the
decision to serve or continue serving infringing content," and thus it
lacked the right or ability to control such content.110
It would seem that YouTube falls within a gray area between
Napster's closed-universe system and Google's open, web-based one.
Although YouTube is open to the entire web and anyone can access
and upload videos onto the site, once a given video is removed from
YouTube's site, it is rendered inaccessible to all visitors. Thus, users
must attempt to find that clip on other VSIs, of which only a handful
exist, where the video may or may not be posted. Whereas with Google
images, the infringing websites remain accessible despite efforts taken
by Google to de-link the image from its site, infringing copies that are
removed from YouTube's site actually cease to exist. This difference
suggests that YouTube does in fact have a higher degree of control
over the infringing copies on its site than Google does over its images.
Like Google, however, YouTube arguably would be unable to
establish an automated system that could monitor whether each video
uploaded onto the site was a copyrighted work owned by someone else.
Although the company is exploring the idea of using software
programs that detect known copyrighted works using auditory signals,
it is doubtful that such software could be used for all copyrighted
works on the site, and it is likely that YouTube's users would find
ways around the system.11'
In sum, it appears that YouTube does have the right and the
ability to control infringing activity on its servers, especially if it
108. 239 F.3d 1004, 1023 (9th Cir. 2001).
109. E.g., Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 857-58 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (denying a
preliminary injunction against Google for vicarious liability for infringement), aff'd in relevant
part, Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 731 (9th Cir. 2007).
110. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d at 857-58.
111. Andy Beal, Google Gives-up Building Own YouTube Filters, Follows MySpace's Lead,
Feb. 23, 2007, http://www.marketingpilgrim.com/2007/02/google-gives-up-building-own-youtube-
filters-follows-myspaces-lead.html (noting that "Google has signed a deal with Audible Magic to
screen uploaded videos for copyrighted content"). This additional filtering system suggests that
YouTube does have a greater "right and ability to control" its users' posted content.
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develops auditory-signal software. First, YouTube is capable of
deleting infringing content immediately once notified of it.112 Second,
when such files are deleted, users are incapable of accessing the videos
from the site. Finally, YouTube employees already carry out some
screening for pornographic videos, hate videos, and similar files. 113
Although it remains difficult for employees to examine every file to
determine if it is copyrighted, screening of many videos is likely to
occur.1 1 4 Thus, it is likely, though admittedly uncertain, that YouTube
would be held vicariously liable absent safe harbor protection.
3. Contributory Infringement
YouTube could also be liable under the theory of contributory
infringement, though this is even less likely. To be liable as a
contributory infringer, one must have knowledge of infringing activity
and must substantially participate in the underlying infringement. 1 5
Knowledge of infringement can be constructive1 16 and is therefore an
easily met standard. In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., the Supreme Court held that Sony's development and
sale of the Betamax video recorder would have met this requirement if
not for the fact that the Betamax could be, and in fact was, used for
"substantial non-infringing uses."117 In that case, Sony knew that
some users of the Betamax would illegally reproduce copyrighted
materials with the video recorders. 118 However, because these devices
could be used for mere "time-shifting," or watching an already free or
paid-for program at a different time, and this was deemed to be fair
use,' 19 the video recorder was viewed by the Court as a "staple article
of commerce" and as having substantial non-infringing uses. The
112. In fact, the company deleted over 30,000 Japanese anime videos in a very short period
of time upon notification that they were copyrighted. Associated Press, YouTube Deletes 30,000
Files After a Copyright Complaint, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2006, at C4.
113. Woolley, supra note 6.
114. Beal, supra note 111.
115. See Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir.
1971) (stating that "one who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or
materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a 'contributory'
infringer").
116. CoStar Group, Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 549 (4th Cir. 2004) (noting "[wihile
the Copyright Act does not require that the infringer know that he is infringing or that his
conduct amount to a willful violation of the copyright owner's rights, it nonetheless requires
conduct by a person who causes in some meaningful way an infringement").
117. 464 U.S. 417, 439-42 (1984).
118. Id. at 439.
119. See infra Part III.A.4 (discussing the requirements for a fair use defense).
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Court held that these non-infringing uses eliminated any constructive
knowledge by Sony that users would employ the device to infringe. 120
There is no doubt that YouTube has constructive knowledge of
users exploiting its website to infringe. The company has been notified
numerous times about infringing content located on its servers and
has removed thousands of infringing files.1 21 Additionally, if Sony was
held to have participated substantially in the infringement just by
selling and developing the Betamax video recorder, it seems logical to
infer that YouTube has participated substantially in the infringing
activity of its users just by providing the forum for users to post and
comment on videos, including copyrighted videos. 122 Thus, YouTube
clearly has constructive knowledge that its site can be-and is-used
to infringe.1 23
YouTube, however, could be safe from liability for contributory
infringement if it lacks constructive knowledge that its users are
using its service to infringe, which YouTube can demonstrate, as a
service with substantial non-infringing uses. Here, a court likely
would hold that, just as Sony's Betamax recorder had substantial non-
infringing uses and thus was a "staple article of commerce,"1 24
YouTube's post-and-comment video service has substantial non-
infringing uses because the site acts as a forum for users to share and
comment on non-copyrighted, personal videos. In this light, not only
does YouTube's service not infringe, but also it encourages creativity,
which is one of the major goals of U.S. copyright law.' 25 Additionally,
as YouTube acquires more licensing deals with copyright content
providers,1 26 the percentage of non-infringing content on its servers
120. Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 442-47.
121. Indeed, this practice has continued since its sale to Google. See, e.g., YouTube Deletes
30,000 Files, supra note 112 (noting that YouTube deleted 30,000 files in response to a copyright
infringement notice).
122. The substantial participation requirement is very easily met. Recall Fonovisa, Inc. v.
Cherry Auction, Inc., in which a flea market operator was found to have substantially
participated in infringing activity carried out by one of its booth renters when it merely rented
the booth to the bootlegger, knowing that he was going to sell illegal copies. 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th
Cir. 1996); see supra note 51 and accompanying text.
123. In fact, YouTube has an information page providing copyright information to users
because the site had received so many questions regarding the matter. YouTube Copyright Tips,
http://www.youtube.com/t/howto-copyright (last visited Aug. 24, 2007).
124. Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 456.
125. The "goals of the copyright law [are] 'to stimulate the creation and publication of
edifying matter."' Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994) (quoting Pierre N.
Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1105, 1134 (1990)).
126. See Google Quizzed over YouTube Plans, supra note 89 (noting that "YouTube has
signed content deals with entertainment giants CBS, Universal Music Group, Sony BMG, NBC
and Warner Music Group").
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increases. As non-infringing content grows, it becomes increasingly
likely that a court would hold that YouTube's service has substantial
non-infringing uses and is a "staple article of commerce." Indeed, the
Sony court agreed that using the Betamax to "time-shift" constituted a
substantial non-infringing use, highlighting that where there was a
high degree of copyright holder consent, there was no infringement.' 27
Therefore, it is likely that YouTube's service would be held to have
substantial non-infringing uses, and YouTube could be protected from
infringement as a contributory infringer. 128
4. Fair Use Defense
Even if YouTube would be found liable under one or more of
these infringement theories, it could (and likely would) argue that the
copying carried out by its users was fair use and, therefore, that it
should not be liable for the infringement. Section 107 of the Copyright
Act provides that "the fair use of a copyrighted work ... is not an
infringement of copyright" and acts as an affirmative defense against
claims of copyright infringement.' 29  To determine whether a
copyrighted work was copied for a fair use, a court must balance the
following four factors: (1) "the purpose and character of the use," (2)
"the nature of the copyrighted work," (3) the amount of the work used
in relation to the whole, and (4) the potential market effect of the
use.130 Although these factors are each important, they are not
necessarily treated equally under fair use analysis and, at different
times, have been weighted more or less heavily in courts' fair use
analysis. 131 Today, it is generally accepted that determining the
127. Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 443 (noting that because time-shifting enlarges the
audience, "a significant amount of [the copyrighted material] may be used in this manner
without objection from the owners of the copyrights...").
128. Substantial noninfringing uses can be negated if it is shown that an individual actively
induced people to use his or her product to infringe. See MGM Studies, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545
U.S. 913, 936-37 (2005) (holding that "one who distributes a device with the object of promoting
its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to
foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties").
Nevertheless, YouTube in no way actively induces people to post copyrighted files on its servers.
It has an open policy against such posting, which suggests that it is not an active inducer.
129. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2007).
130. Id.
131. For example, from about 1984 to 1994, factor four (market potential) was deemed by
many, including the Supreme Court, to be the factor of most importance. See Sony Corp. of Am.,
464 U.S. at 448-52 (discussing the importance of the fourth factor); Consumers Union of U.S.,
Inc. v. Gen. Signal Corp. 724 F.2d 1044, 1050 (2d Cir. 1983) ("[The fourth] factor is 'widely
accepted to be the most important.' " (quoting Triangle Publ'ns. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers,
626 F.2d 1171, 1177 (5th Cir. 1980))). Today, as discussed below, factor one (purpose and
character of the use) is more important. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,
1578 [Vol. 60:5:1559
THE DIGITAL TITANIC
purpose and character of the use, in particular whether such use was
"transformative" as opposed to "superseding," trumps the other three
factors. 132 However, given that each factor is important, a brief
discussion of each is warranted.
When assessing purpose and character of the use of the copy,
the court asks whether the new work "merely 'supersede[s] the objects'
of the original creation ... or instead adds something new, with a
further purpose or different character" such that new meaning is
added to the work. 133 For example, under this test, the Supreme Court
held that a parody of the song "Pretty Woman" was in fact
transformative in nature because it added humor and critical
commentary.' 34 In YouTube's case, although some of the infringing
material posted by users is transformative in nature, 13 5 the majority is
directly copied from an original source, such as a TV show. Thus, in
YouTube's case, depending on who brings the suit and which material
is implicated, factor one of the fair use analysis could weigh in
YouTube's favor. However, many illegally posted videos on YouTube
consist of simple, direct copies of video clips or sound bites used in a
non-transformative manner, and consequently, the first factor likely
would weigh towards holding YouTube liable.
The second factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, likely
also would favor liability. 136 This factor asks the court to examine
whether the original material copied deserved core copyright
protection. 137  Original creative works used for entertainment
purposes, non-published works, and non-informational works fall into
this category. 38 Here, although the works posted on YouTube usually
have already been published (and therefore deserve less protection
than, say, unpublished works),139 a majority of the videos originally
were created to provide entertainment, which suggests they are
579 (1994) (noting that whether the purpose and character of a use is "transformative" is more
important than whether the use has a market impact).
132. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
133. Id. (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C. Mass. 1841).
134. Id. at 579-82.
135. Some users alter copyrighted pieces by adding their own commentary over them, mixing
copyrighted songs with home videos, for example. See, e.g., YouTube Home Page, supra note 3
(search for "beatboxing flute super mario brothers theme" to watch a movie of a flute
performance of the super Mario brothers theme, which is copyrighted by Nintendo) (last visited
Sept. 18, 2007).
136. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2007).
137. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586.
138. Id.
139. See Haper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 551-52 (1985) (noting
that the copying of unpublished works makes it difficult to acquire a fair use defense).
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deserved of greater protection under the law. Thus, these videos
clearly fall within the core provision of copyright law and it is likely
that a court would weigh this factor for holding YouTube liable.
YouTube may have better luck arguing that the copied works
did not take substantial portions or amounts of the original works and
therefore satisfy the "relation to the whole" factor.140 Under this factor,
a court examines whether a substantial amount of an original work
was copied or whether the "heart" of the work was copied. 141 Here,
YouTube would argue that video clips posted on the site can be only
ten minutes in length, and many of the copied videos are only three to
four minutes long.1 42 Arguably, these small clips are not substantial
takings of the underlying copyrighted work because the portion posted
is a small percentage of the length of the original. In many cases,
however, the clips posted are the most memorable moments of a
particular TV episode, movie, or performance. These videos may be
seen as substantial copies of the originals because they copy the
"heart" of the work at issue. Additionally, users can upload entire
works in ten-minute installments, thereby evading YouTube's
limitation. 143 Consequently, although this factor initially appears to
bolster YouTube's defense, it is likely that a court would hold that
such takings are substantial.
Turning to the fourth requirement, the Supreme Court in Sony
Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. stated that "every
commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair
exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the
copyrighted work. . . ."144 Thus, if an infringing copy would affect the
market for a particular copyrightable work in any way, such a copy
would be presumptively unfair. In YouTube's case, the copied videos
likely have a significant impact on the market of the original works;
thus, this factor would weigh against YouTube's fair use defense.
Because most of the posted videos are exact copies of works of
entertainment, they directly compete with sales of these works (e.g.,
DVDs, iTunes, TV shows). This disruption is even more evident for
rare works, such as old TV performances of famous bands. Few people
have the copyright to these works, and therefore the impact on the
copyright owners is great. Free access to these video performances
140. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
141. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 587. See also Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 565 (remarking how
taking the "heart of the book" was a substantial taking of a copyrighted book).
142. See Google Quizzed over YouTube Plans, supra note 89 (noting that YouTube allows the
posting of clips up to ten minutes in length).
143. Id.
144. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984).
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completely disrupts this market. It would thus seem that YouTube
does not fall under the fourth factor's ambit. 145 In sum, YouTube does
not have a valid fair use defense, and it is likely that absent safe
harbor protection, it would be liable for copyright infringement.
B. Is YouTube as Safe as it Claims to Be?
Given that VSIs such as YouTube likely would be liable under
traditional theories of copyright infringement, determining whether
YouTube meets the requirements for safe harbor protection is integral
to analyzing whether it is open to liability under its current
operational framework. These requirements, found in 17 U.S.C. §§
512(c) and 512(i), have not been litigated heavily and, as such, the
analysis below hypothesizes one possible outcome. The following
section will discuss whether YouTube satisfies the threshold eligibility
requirements for safe harbor protection and then will explore whether
it meets the additional requirements set forth in § 512(c). As explained
below, it is unclear whether YouTube, as it currently stands, would
fall short of meeting the requirements for safe harbor protection, but it
seems likely that, as Google grooms YouTube to be the future of
television, it inadvertently will steer the digital giant into a legal
iceberg.
1. Threshold Eligibility Requirements for Safe Harbor Protection
Protection from liability via any of the safe harbor provisions
laid out in § 512 of the DMCA is afforded only if the ISP (1) has
"adopted" and "implemented" a termination policy for account holders
who are repeat infringers, (2) has notified users of such a policy, and
(3) "accommodates and does not interfere with standard technical
measures." 146 As discussed below, it is clear that under YouTube's
current operational framework, the company complies with these
relatively weak threshold requirements.
Because meeting the first two requirements is relatively easy,
YouTube and all of the other VSIs clearly comply with them by
adopting, implementing, and informing account holders of a
termination policy for repeat infringers. In In re Aimster Copyright
145. Today, however, this factor does not matter as much, considering that the court is more
interested in looking at the transformative nature of a given work. See supra text accompanying
note 131. It follows that something that is transformative per factor one will not have a
substantial effect on the market for the copyrighted work because it will likely be in a market of
its own.
146. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i) (2007).
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Litigation, an Illinois district court found that Aimster had adopted a
policy against repeat infringers by informing users via the copyright
notice on its website that it expected them to conform to all copyright
laws, provided a detailed form for copyright owners to notify Aimster
of infringing files, and stated in the policy that "users who are found to
repeatedly violate copyright rights of others may have their access to
all services terminated."' 147 Thus, the law requires a bare minimum for
an ISP to have adopted and notified users of a termination policy for
repeat infringers.
YouTube and the other VSIs have clearly satisfied the
termination requirement. YouTube's Terms of Use not only provide
that users who upload files onto the site agree not to submit
copyrighted files, but also state that "YouTube will also terminate a
User's access to its Website, if they [sic] are determined to be a repeat
infringer" and provide detailed instructions on how a copyright owner
can send YouTube notice of infringing activity. 148 This policy closely
parallels that of Aimster and likely would satisfy the adoption and
informational requirements of § 512(i)(1)(A).
Litigants, however, may accuse YouTube and the other VSIs of
ineffectively implementing their repeat infringer policies. In In re
Aimster Copyright Litigation, Aimster was not afforded safe harbor
protection partially because it was found not to have implemented a
repeat infringer policy effectively. 149 In that case, the repeat infringer
policy was incapable of implementation because Aimster's encryption
system rendered impossible determining which users were uploading
which files onto its servers. 150 Therefore, the plaintiffs could not
"demonstrate that any particular user [wa]s actually transferring any
of [the infringing] files (which would be an infringing activity)," and
thus no user could be found to be a repeat infringer.151
Unlike in Aimster, however, a court likely would find that
YouTube and the other VSIs have implemented their repeat infringer
policies effectively. Although there is no data indicating how many
repeat infringers have had their video-sharing accounts terminated,
by simply requiring the creation of a user account, YouTube and other
VSIs can track which users are notified repeatedly of infringement. 15 2
Even though repeat infringers simply can create new user accounts
147. 252 F. Supp. 2d 634, 658-59 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
148. YouTube Terms of Use, http://www.youtube.comt/terms (last visited Aug. 24, 2007).
149. Aimster, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 659.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See Join YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/signup?next=/my videos-upload%3F (last
visited Aug. 24, 2007) (directing nonmembers to create a YouTube account).
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using different e-mail addresses and usernames to upload the same
infringing files, courts are unlikely to find that YouTube and the other
VSIs did not implement a termination policy effectively because the
user, as identified by his or her username, would always be subject to
proper termination under the policy. Therefore, YouTube and the
other VSIs likely would satisfy this initial eligibility requirement for
safe harbor protection.
Similarly, YouTube likely would satisfy the third eligibility
requirement. Section 512(i) states that in addition to adopting a
termination policy for repeat infringers, ISPs must also "accommodate
and ... not interfere with standard technical measures," which are
defined as "technical measures that are used by copyright owners to
identify or protect copyrighted works." 153 To be classified as a standard
technical measure, the measure must have been developed in a
"voluntary, multi-industry standards process" and have been accepted
by a broad consensus of copyright owners and service providers. 154
Additionally, the measures must be made reasonably available in a
non-discriminatory fashion to all without imposing substantial costs
on ISPs.155
Currently, there is very little authority discussing whether
standard technical measures exist in any context, let alone in the
video-sharing arena. 156 However, it is clear from the language of §
512(i) outlined above that standard technical measures are not meant
to be created easily. For example, each measure must be adopted
through a broad consensus between ISPs and copyright owners. 157 In
general, ISPs and copyright owners will disagree on particular
measures because they have competing incentives. Because ISPs seek
to attract the public to gain advertising revenue, they will try to
minimize, copyright protection so that potential users can view, edit,
hear, or see copyrighted material freely. Copyright owners, on the
other hand, want the most protection possible so that creators can
reap the benefits of their efforts. This conflict of interest makes a
153. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i) (2007).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. A LexisNexis search for "standard technical measures" retrieved only nine cases, all of
which simply used the term when quoting the language directly from 512(i). None of these cases
discussed "standard technical measures" in any detail. E.g. Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488
F.3d 1102, 1115 (9th Cir. 2007); Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1080 (9th Cir. 2004); Tur v.
Youtube, Inc., No. CV 06-4436 FMC (AJWx), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50254, at *7-8 (C.D. Cal.
2007); Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1099 (W.D. Wash. 2004); Perfect
10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1174 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
157. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i); see also NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 56, § 12B.02 (discussing the
likelihood that standard technical measures will come into existence).
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concurrence between the ISPs and copyright owners nearly
impossible, and thus, it is likely that there never will be any standard
technical measures required for VSIs. 158 Therefore, YouTube and the
other VSIs meet these threshold requirements for safe harbor
eligibility.
2. Core Eligibility Requirements Under § 512(c)
In addition to the safe harbor threshold requirements,
YouTube must meet the core eligibility requirements of DMCA § 512.
Because YouTube does not "transmit], rout[e], or provid[e]
connections for" copyrighted material or the "transient" storage of
such material, 159 does not store infringing material "on a system or
network controlled" by the ISP,160 and does not link its users to an
"online location containing infringing material" by using a hyperlink,
pointer, reference or other online tool,16' the only core requirements
VSIs must satisfy are the three safe harbor requirements parsed out
in § 512(c). This section requires that ISPs not (1) have actual or
apparent knowledge of infringing activity, (2) receive a direct financial
benefit from the infringing and have the right and ability to control
the content of users' postings, or (3) allow infringing files to remain on
the server upon notification that such files exist.162
a. Actual or Apparent Knowledge
Section 512(c)(1)(A) of the DMCA provides that ISPs shall not
be liable for copyright infringement if they (1) do not "have actual
knowledge" that there is infringing material or activity using the
material on their systems or networks, (2) "in the absence of such
actual knowledge, [are] not aware of facts or circumstances from
which infringing activity is apparent," and (3) once acquiring any
158. In fact, the DMCA was enacted largely to "balance copyright owners' interests in
protecting their rights with the need to foster the Internet as an important medium of free
expression, cultural exchange, and commerce."' Jordana Boag, Comment, The Battle of Piracy
Versus Privacy: How the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) Is Using the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) as Its Weapon Against Internet Users' Privacy Rights, 41 CAL.
W. L. REV. 241, 245 (2004) (quoting Verizon Internet Services Inc.'s Motion to Expedite at 5,
Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 244 (D.D.C. 2003)
(No. 03.7015)). The fact that it took legislative action to reach an agreement between copyright
holders and ISPs suggests that similar action is required for there ever to be agreement as to
what constitutes a standard technical measure.
159. 17 U.S.C. § 512(a).
160. Id. § 512(b).
161. Id. § 512(d).
162. Id. § 512(c).
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knowledge or awareness of infringing activity, "actf expeditiously to
remove" the material. 163 Many cases discuss the actual knowledge
requirement and almost everyone acknowledges that the standard is
difficult to meet, meaning that more often than not, an ISP will not
have actual knowledge of infringing activity. 164 As David Nimmer
stated in his Copyright treatise, "[the] actual knowledge standard is
high, and by itself does not reach an entity that willfully ignores
blatant indications of infringement."'165 To have actual knowledge of
infringing material or activity, direct notice of the activity or material
is almost always required, though not expressly so.1 66 Absent notice,
proving actual knowledge is difficult-one must show that the ISP
knew about the specific infringing material or activity in question, not
that the ISP merely knew about or had notice of other infringing
material or activity on its servers.16 7
Given the difficulty in meeting the actual knowledge standard,
it is likely that YouTube and other VSIs would not be found to have
knowledge of infringing activity on their servers. Although YouTube
has actual knowledge that some infringing files exist on its servers
(because some users repost the same copyrighted videos that YouTube
already has been asked to remove), a court likely would still find that
YouTube lacked actual knowledge as to the newly reposted files. As
discussed above, the actual knowledge standard does not take into
account whether YouTube should have known that such infringing
files were indeed infringing or that a given user's activity was
infringing; rather, the standard requires actual knowledge as to each
separate occurrence of infringement, even if a file is simply reposted.
Because YouTube's video uploading is completely automatic, it could
argue successfully that it did not have actual knowledge that the
infringing files had been posted again because it was not notified of
the post.
It is equally certain that YouTube would be able to meet the
second requirement of § 512(c)(1)(A)-lack of awareness of facts or
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent.1 68 According
to Nimmer, this prong requires courts to perform a "red flag" test that
looks to "whether the service provider deliberately proceeded in the
163. Id.
164. See, e.g., Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1107-08 (W.D. Wash.
2004) (commenting that notice, although not required by the DMCA, is the principle way of
showing actual knowledge and that it is difficult to prove such knowledge absent proper notice).
165. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 56, § 12B.04.
166. Corbis Corp., 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1107-08.
167. Id.
168. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii).
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face of blatant factors of which it was aware" and not whether the
service provider knew or should have known that there was infringing
material, on or activity taking place via, its servers. 169 This "red flag
test" has two elements, one subjective and one objective. 170 The
subjective element asks whether the service provider was aware of a
particular red flag (e.g. infringing material or activity), while the
objective element asks whether a reasonable person under similar
circumstances would have treated the facts in question as a "red
flag."1 71 Apparent knowledge is difficult to prove, and "requires
evidence that a service provider 'turned a blind eye to 'red flags' of
obvious infringement.' ",172
Under YouTube's operational framework, it is unlikely that
YouTube would be found to have apparent knowledge of infringing
material or activity. Applying the two-step test to the general facts at
hand, YouTube does not have apparent knowledge of infringing
material or activity, despite the fact that it must be aware that
infringing activity generally takes place on its servers on a daily basis.
A court likely would find that a reasonable person would treat the
facts here as a red flag, and thus, YouTube Would fail the objective
test for apparent knowledge. Arguably, a reasonable person would
know that YouTube is host to myriad copyrighted videos. YouTube's
users probably constitute "reasonable people," and they visit the site
to watch copyrighted videos. Therefore, a court would likely find that a
reasonable person would take YouTube's popularity into account,
along with the plethora of news stories that suggest copyrighted files
are on YouTube's servers, and would decide that a reasonable person
would have been aware that YouTube was being used for infringement
purposes.
Despite this outcome, YouTube likely still would not be held to
have apparent knowledge because it lacks subjective knowledge of
infringement. The subjective prong asks whether the ISP is aware of a
particular infringing activity or file, not whether it should have known
of infringing activity in general. 173 Thus, a plaintiff would have to
show that YouTube was aware that a particular infringing file or
169. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 56, § 12B.04; see Costar Group, Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 164
F. Supp. 2d 688, 702-03 (D. Md. 2001) (accepting the "red flag" test).
170. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 56, § 12B.04.
171. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 105-190, at 44 (1998)).
172. Corbis, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1108 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 42). Nimmer
even quipped that "the 'flag' must be brightly red indeed-and be waving blatantly in the
provider's face-to serve the statutory goal of making 'infringing activity... apparent.'" NIMMER
& NIMMER, supra note 56, § 12B.04.
173. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 56, § 12B.04.
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activity was on, or taking place on, its servers and that YouTube did
nothing to remove or deny access to it. Because YouTube does not
screen every one of its files, it would be difficult to prove that it was
aware of a particular infringing file or particular activity by a specific
user. The uploading process, YouTube would argue, is completely
automated, and consequently, the company lacks facts that would
make it aware that a particular infringing file was located on its
servers. Thus, it likely would not meet the subjective element of this
test.
Because YouTube probably would be deemed not to have actual
or apparent knowledge as to infringing activity or material on its site,
the third prong of § 512(c)(1)(a) is irrelevant. 174 This prong only
applies once an ISP has obtained such knowledge as described
above. 175 Because YouTube arguably does not have such knowledge,
the fact that it does not remove the infringing files on its servers
absent notification by a copyright holder is irrelevant. However, if a
court found that YouTube has apparent or actual knowledge, it is
likely that YouTube would fall outside the safe harbor provisions'
protective ambit.
b. Financial Benefit and Right and Ability to Control
As discussed above, 176 YouTube apparently receives a direct
financial benefit from the infringing activity of its users and has the
right and ability to control their activity and postings, at least in the
context of vicarious liability. Thus, it "receive[s] a financial benefit
directly attributed to the infringing activity, in a case in which the
service provider has the right and ability to control such activity."177
However, as Nimmer notes, Congress intended for the safe harbor to
extend to those who could be held vicariously liable.178 Therefore,
Congress must have meant for § 512(c)(1)(b) to codify something
174. This section provides that "upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, [an ISP must]
act[] expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material." 17 U.S.C. §512(c)(1)(A)(iii)
(2007).
175. Id.
176. See supra Part III.A.2 (discussing vicarious liability).
177. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B).
178. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 56, § 12B.04; but see Costar Group, Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc.,
164 F. Supp. 2d 688, 704 (D. Md. 2001) (noting that because § 512(c)(1)(b) codified both elements
of vicarious liability, Congress intended there to be no protection for vicarious infringers). The
Fourth Circuit, however, in affirming the outcome in Costar, mentioned that vicarious and
contributory infringing ISPs could "still look to the DMCA for a safe harbor if it fulfilled the
conditions therein," Costar Group, Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 555 (4th Cir. 2004), which
suggests that the DMCA does protect vicarious infringers to some extent.
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beyond the elements of vicarious liability. The legislative history
states that, in determining whether an ISP received a direct financial
benefit, "courts should take a common-sense, fact-based approach, not
a formalistic one."179 Consequently, a legitimate business would fall
outside of this category as long as both the infringer and non-infringer
pay the same fee to use the service or if the fee is not "plainly tied to
providing direct access to infringing material."180 In short, this
requirement seems more difficult to prove than the "direct financial
benefit" requirement under vicarious liability, and it would seem that
YouTube is therefore safe under this element.
Currently, advertising revenue does not constitute a direct
financial benefit associated with infringing activity as it is analyzed
under § 512(c)(1)(b), although this too remains unclear.181 However,
given that Google is grooming YouTube as the future of television, it is
possible that, given time, YouTube will acquire more control over
users of the site, will obtain even more direct gains from advertising
revenue and the like, and ultimately would face liability under §
512(c)(1)(b). 18 2
It is also likely that, with time, YouTube will satisfy §
512(c)(1)(b)'s right and ability to control requirement. The Central
District of California held in Hendrickson v. EBay, Inc. that right and
ability to control cannot simply mean removing or blocking access to
infringing files, given that such activity was already required
elsewhere in the statute.' 83 Whereas right and ability to control for
vicarious liability is relatively easy to prove, it seems that in the
179. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 56, § 12B.04 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 54
(1998)).
180. Id.
181. Indeed, for there to be a "direct financial benefit" under vicarious liability, the court
must ask only "whether there is a causal relationship between the infringing activity and any
financial benefit a defendant reaps, regardless of how substantial the benefit is in proportion to a
defendant's overall profits." Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 2004). See also
A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1023 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that because
Napster's future revenue was "directly dependent on 'increases in user-base,' " and because
"[flinancial benefit exists where the availability of infringing material 'acts as a "draw" for
customers,' " Napster was found to receive a direct financial benefit from infringing activity in
the context of vicarious liability (quoting Fonovision, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259,
263-64 (9th Cir. 1996))).
182. Although the Ninth Circuit in Napster held that this type of system constituted a direct
financial benefit under the theory of vicarious liability, Napster, 239 F.3d at 1023, it is likely
that, given the stricter requirements imposed by § 512(c)(1)(b), the court would find that this was
not enough to constitute a direct financial benefit under this section.
183. "Congress could not have intended for courts to hold that a service provider loses
immunity under the safe harbor provision of the DMCA because it engages in acts that are
specifically required by the DMCA." Hendrickson v. EBay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1093-94
(C.D. Cal. 2001).
1588 [Vol. 60:5:1559
THE DIGITAL TITANIC
context of § 512(c)(1)(b), doing so is slightly more difficult because the
section was meant to protect entities that would otherwise be held to
be vicariously liable.
Given this high threshold for showing direct financial benefit
and right and ability to control, YouTube, as it currently operates,
probably would satisfy these requirements and therefore fall under
safe harbor protection for the immediate future. It can be argued,
however, that by acquiring licensing deals and incorporating digital-
signature recognition software into its site, YouTube has already
established a "right and ability to control" its users that will satisfy §
512(c)(1)(b). Additionally, YouTube screens some videos and even
posts "adult warnings" for material that it deems to be for mature
audiences. All of this evidence suggests that YouTube, even as it
currently operates, may have sufficient right and ability to control its
users, their activity, and the content that they post.
c. Expeditious Removal of Infringing Material
YouTube likely would satisfy this third and final factor
required for safe harbor protection. Under § 512(c)(1)(c), ISPs must,
upon notification of infringement, expeditiously remove the infringing
material or disable access to it.184 To date, YouTube has complied with
this provision in every case of notification. It has quickly removed
videos of Saturday Night Live sketches, Comedy Central TV shows,
and more than 30,000 Japanese anime videos.18 5 YouTube could be
charged with noncompliance only if "expeditiously removing" files
from a server means doing so permanently. YouTube currently does
not prevent users from reposting infringing videos almost immediately
after their removal, especially if a user posted a given video under a
different title. Thus, it does not act to permanently remove this
material from its site or "disable access to it."186
A court likely would find the above statutory interpretation
lacking, given that the language says nothing about a permanent
removal. Taken in context with the other paragraphs of § 512(c), this
184. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C) (2007).
185. "Lazy Sunday," a Saturday Night Live skit, was removed from YouTube in January
2007 after the site was asked to pull the video. Jason Pontin, Millions of Videos, and Now a Way
to Search Inside Them, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2007, at 33; see also Associated Press, supra note
112 (commenting on YouTube's removal of 30,000 Japanese videos).
186. See Viacom Peeved About Clips on YouTube, CBC NEWS, Feb. 2, 2007,
http://www.cbc.ca/technology/story/2007/02/02/tech-youtube.html (noting that even after
YouTube removed a clip in September 2006, "the clip still appeared periodically as users kept
reposting it," which suggests that YouTube was having problems with its copyright filters
"designed to prevent the unauthorized distribution of copyrighted materials").
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provision suggests that copyright owners must make a separate
notification to an ISP each time they find infringing material on the
site.187 YouTube would argue that the statute reads "upon notification
of claimed infringement" and that these are new cases of
infringement, not those of which it had originally been notified.
Consequently, YouTube would not be required to remove expeditiously
the reposted videos until notified that the videos are back on the site.
Given that the statute so clearly requires ISPs to remove only "the
material that is claimed to be infringing" in the notification,1 8 8 a court
likely would follow this interpretation of the requirement. Under this
lenient reading, YouTube likely meets the criteria established by this
provision and thus would not be exempt from safe harbor protection,
though, as suggested, the conclusion is not entirely certain.
IV. CREATING A COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION TO BALANCE THE
INTERESTS OF COPYRIGHT OWNERS AND VSIS
Given YouTube's current operational framework, it would
appear, as discussed in detail above, 189 that it is probably safe from
liability. However, as Google augments YouTube's business model,
adds more advertising to the site, and develops and implements
software to automatically search YouTube's servers for copyrighted
works, this likely will change. Although copyrighted videos would get
weeded out more efficiently through these novel digital-signature
software programs, it is likely that video "mash-ups,"190 which may be
derivative works of copyrighted works (and therefore in violation of
the derivative work right granted in § 106(2)),191 will pass under the
radar and that users will find ways around the software protection
and will repost copyrighted material. Indeed, the site probably never
will be devoid of copyrighted files.1 92 Consequently, the following
187. Congress has remarked that notification is not required for an ISP to be required to
expeditiously remove infringing files. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 56, § 12B.04.
Nevertheless, as discussed above, notification is the key way in which actual knowledge (and
even apparent knowledge in many circumstances) is attributed to the ISP so as to even be
required to remove files in the first place.
188. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C).
189. See supra Part III (commenting on YouTube's liability under traditional theories of
copyright and under the DMCA's safe harbor provisions).
190. A "mash up" is "[a] new sound recording produced entirely of preexisting sound
recordings." Aaron Power, The Mouse That Roared: Addressing the Post-Modern Quandary of
Mash-Ups Through Traditional Fair Use Analysis, 8 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 531, 532 (2006).
This practice can be done with video files as well.
191. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
192. For example, almost three months after searching for Animaniacs videos on YouTube
for this note's introduction, the same video clips are still present.
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questions remain: (1) what should YouTube do to protect itself from
liability in the future, (2) should we welcome YouTube's liability or
pass new regulations that would protect YouTube and other similarly
situated VSIs, and (3) if such regulations are passed, what should they
entail?
A. YouTube Can Take Action to Avoid Liability
YouTube already is taking important first steps to protect itself
from liability. As noted above, the company has entered into a series of
licensing agreements with companies such as Warner Music and Sony
BMG in which YouTube shares some of its advertising revenue in
return for licenses to post copyrighted files owned by these
companies. 193 YouTube should continue to pursue these agreements
with as many companies as possible, but should focus on large
companies with the greatest amount of copyrighted material, so as to
protect itself as fully as possible from liability. This business
framework is a win-win situation for all involved. Customers will use
YouTube knowing that it is a safe place to view copyrighted material.
This legitimacy will allow Google to charge more for advertising and
ultimately to pay for more licenses from these companies. Reciprocity
also clears Google of any liability for most of the copyrighted work now
present on the site. 194
At the same time, YouTube should attempt to obtain greater
user identification, such as a name and a street address, when a
visitor uploads a video. Currently, YouTube requires only an e-mail
address. 195 If YouTube demanded more information, and specified in
its Terms and Conditions that it will share such information with the
owner of a copyrighted work if an infringement suit is filed, people
would be less likely to upload copyrighted work for fear of a direct
infringement suit being brought against them. Although this
precaution would not stop dedicated infringers from entering faulty
information, it likely would deter the average poster from doing so,
and it could have a quantitative impact on the number of illegally
posted copyrighted videos. Moreover, this practice would not increase
193. Viacom Confronts YouTube on Videos, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 3, 2007, at 13.
194. Google/YouTube, therefore, should be more willing to pay for these licenses as well.
Recently, negotiations between the company and Viacom broke down, after which Viacom,
having joined with another VSI, ordered YouTube to remove over 100,000 videos which
contained Viacom's content. Id.; see also Dan Mitchell, Sharing the Wealth at MTV, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 24, 2007, at C5 (noting that Viacom left its deal with YouTube in favor of another company,
Joost).
195. Join YouTube, supra note 152.
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YouTube's right and ability to control what gets posted on the site,
because YouTube would not be selecting the videos displayed on its
site,1 96 but rather would serve as an ex ante control. As such, YouTube
would remain protected under the safe harbor provisions if it
implemented this procedure. In sum, an increased number of licenses,
the implementation of digital signature technology, and ending user
anonymity would help to alleviate the possible threat of liability for
infringement suits in YouTube's future. 197
B. Public Policy Issues Regarding VSIs'Possible Copyright Liability
Ultimately, subjecting YouTube to liability from copyright
owners could destroy a major facilitator of American creativity and an
informational archive. U.S. copyright law's goal is to provide authors
with a monopoly over their creative work so as to incentivise them to
create more. 198 Placing copyrighted files into the public domain aids
this goal by providing members of the public with a large, creative
foundation from which to build their own ideas. YouTube, as it
currently operates, provides a marketplace for the sharing of ideas
and creative expression. Future "authors" can post their work and
receive immediate public feedback. This environment fosters new and
improved creative products, especially when authors take the public's
constructive criticism into account. New work is created daily, largely
because the creators know that they can share their work with a wide
audience for free. At the same time, many creators post on YouTube
because the site is immensely popular-a popularity that stems
partially from its free copyrighted videos, in addition to these new and
unique works. 199 Subjecting YouTube to liability for the infringing
videos could potentially bankrupt the company and destroy this forum
of creative sharing. 200 Such an outcome should be avoided, especially
196. See supra Part III.B.2(b) (discussing right and ability to control).
197. One drawback of implementing digital signature technology to locate copyrighted files,
as YouTube plans to do, Beal, supra note 111, is that a court may view this action as taking on
more of a right and ability to control the posted content, thereby opening YouTube to liability
under § 512(c)(1)(b).
198. "[T]he economic philosophy behind the [Copyright] Clause... is the conviction that
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare
through the talents of authors and inventors." Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 (2003)
(quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954)).
199. '"Iany of YouTube's most widely watched videos already include copyrighted music,
raising the specter of a legal showdown with record labels and artists seeking to protect their
right to be paid for the material." Michael Liedtke, YouThbe, Warner Music Sign Deal, S. FLA.
SUN-SENTINEL, Sept. 19, 2006, at 1D.
200. Note that although new video sharing internet sites could fill the void left behind if
YouTube were to go bankrupt (much like Morpheus did after Napster was shut down),
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considering that fostering creativity is one of copyright law's major
goals. Free access to copyrighted material, however, seems unfair
considering that YouTube, instead of the copyright owners, reaps the
profits stemming from these videos through advertising revenue.
What incentives do "authors" have to create if they are unable to profit
from their creative labor? Although having videos posted on YouTube
will not eliminate an author's revenue, the authors, and not YouTube,
should be the ones receiving the financial benefits of users viewing
their material. Thus, imposing liability seems fair and just, in order to
protect the creators of the copyrighted works.
C. Proposed Legislative Solution
Society should embrace a middle-ground solution that takes
into account the infeasibility of governing every file posted on VSIs,
but at the same time holds them to a slightly higher standard than
the DMCA imposes. A new two-part test should be implemented (in
addition to the threshold eligibility requirements in § 512(i)201) that
would help courts decide if a VSI should be protected from copyright
infringement liability via safe harbor protection. First, courts should
ask whether a reasonable person would have known, or should have
known, about infringing activity or material taking place generally on
a given ISP's servers. If the first question is answered in the
affirmative, courts should then ask whether the VSI has adopted
reasonable, good faith filtering technology or practices to search,
locate, and permanently remove copyrighted files. If so, and a
copyright file still slips through the system, the court should then ask
whether the VSI has been notified to remove the specific copyrighted
file by a copyright owner and expeditiously removed such file upon
notification. As discussed in detail below, this test is more streamlined
than the one offered by the DMCA, it closes up some loopholes in the
statute, and it ultimately holds VSIs responsible for the content on
their sites.
The first part of this solution would lower the knowledge
requirement currently in place under § 512(c)(1)(a). Proving that an
ISP must have actual or apparent knowledge about a particular
eventually all of these sites would likely be subject to the same liability and therefore shut down
(as Morpheus did a few years after Napster), forcing major changes in the business model of
these companies. Such new models could mirror that of iTunes and the new Napster, charging
users a fee to post videos and access copyrighted material. Although the forum would still remain
open, it likely would be hampered severely.
201. See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing these threshold eligibility requirements).
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infringing file or particular activity is almost impossible absent prior
notification. The current standard forces copyright owners to police
VSIs to see if their work has been posted, when it likely would be
much less costly and much more efficient for VSIs to police themselves
on this issue, using digital signature technology or other video filters.
The first part of this test would be very broad and likely would be
satisfied by every VSI on the market, because it only compares VSIs to
a reasonable, objective standard. Consequently, if a reasonable
person-whether through news sources, the VSI site itself, or any
other means-would recognize that a VSI was being used for the
posting of infringing files, a VSI would satisfy this part of the test.
Ultimately, this lowered requirement would force VSIs to enact more
licensing agreements with companies, allowing the money received
from advertising revenue to flow back to the copyright holder. At the
same time, this knowledge standard provides some protection to ISPs,
which could not have been aware that copyrighted files were being
posted on their sites.
Given that the knowledge standard would be reduced, it would
not be as important to condition liability on a direct financial benefit
or the right and ability to control the user. Therefore, this solution will
not consider these DMCA liability requirements. 20 2 Indeed, because
this solution supposes that VSIs will begin to police themselves more
effectively to weed out copyrighted materials posted by users, they
must have more control over what their users can post in the first
place. Under this proposal, the VSIs almost certainly will have the
right and ability to control their users. The solution should not make
liable those entities that are trying to comply with its provisions. At
the same time, showing that the company is receiving a direct
financial benefit from infringing activity is less important in and of
itself. Rather, such evidence could be used to show that the VSI knew
or should have known that infringing activity was taking place on its
servers, therefore satisfying the first part of this new test. Thus, a
separate prong asking whether VSIs are receiving a direct financial
benefit from the infringing activity or material in a context where they
had the right and ability to control the users is not important.
If a VSI should have known of infringing activity on its server,
the court should ask whether the VSI adopted a reasonable, good faith
filtering or screening technology or practice to search, locate, and
permanently remove copyrighted files from its server. If not, the VSI
should be liable for infringement. If a reasonable filtering system is in
place, and a copyright owner still finds his work on the VSI, the court
202. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B) (2007).
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should ask whether the VSI had been notified to remove the specific
copyrighted file by a copyright owner and expeditiously removed such
file. If so, no liability should ensue.
This second part of the test significantly differs from the
DMCA's. First, unlike the DMCA, it requires the permanent removal
of a copyrighted file by the VSI. Given that this solution encourages
self-policing, no longer should VSIs be allowed to say that they
removed infringing files from their servers when the same file simply
can be reposted a day later. This ensures copyright owners that once
they bring the presence of an infringing file to a VSI's attention, that
file will no longer be present on the site, thereby reducing the costs of
the copyright owner associated with policing these sites. It would seem
easier for VSIs to block the uploading of a file and therefore prevent
its reposting, perhaps by using a software program or having
employees manually check uploaded files, than it would be for a
copyright owner to check continuously all of the VSIs to see if its
copyrighted material has been posted illegally. The copyright owner
should not have to keep checking the site because he is not the one
with "unclean hands." Because the test only requires a good faith
effort on the part of VSIs to examine their files, they would be
protected if copyrighted files still slipped through the cracks. Thus,
VSIs should have the burden of checking the site for copyright
infringement because they receive the monetary benefits and have
more information about current postings, and because it is virtually
impossible for a copyright owner to check every Internet site for a
copyright violation.
Moreover, the solution protects VSIs from liability for many
illegal derivative works or rare, copyrighted works posted by users
that slip through the good faith filtering process. In the case of a rare
copyrighted file, the file's obscurity makes it less likely that a VSI
should have known that it was infringing. Also, it is more difficult to
acquire licenses for rare files, given that the copyright has often
shifted hands numerous times and finding the original owner of the
copyrighted file can be quite difficult.20 3 Thus, it is more likely that
such a file would slip through a good faith filtering process and that
an owner would not notify a VSI to remove it. Without this section, if
VSIs wanted to allow posting of this material, they would have to
spend an exorbitant amount of time and money finding the copyright
203. See Steven Hetcher, The Half-Fairness of Google's Plan to Make the World's Collection of
Books Searchable, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 71-76 (discussing the transaction
costs associated with orphan books).
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holder to acquire the license for the video.20 4 This expense would
greatly deter VSIs from allowing the posting of these videos and would
result in a large number of rejected videos. Such a market solution
would result in a great disservice to the public, which might not ever
again see these rare videos. Without a forum for free sharing, these
clips or videos may be forgotten or lost by the time they would move
into the public domain under copyright law. In essence, then, this
solution protects VSIs that are attempting to police themselves.
At the same time, VSIs should be free from liability for works
that are transformative in nature so as to constitute a derivative, new
creation. As Professor Wendy J. Gordon argues, "a person who makes
transformative use, in a context where the use is not ordinarily
accompanied by pre-use negotiation or licensing, should be free of
liability."20 5 Gordon suggests that by focusing on the defendants'
"ordinary expectations involving market involvement," the majority of
people using copyrighted material just to copy it would be liable for
infringement, while those who actually created something new, and
therefore furthered the goal of copyright, would be protected. 20 6
Because a reasonable screening system may fail to detect users'
transformative, derivative works that only use parts of a copyrighted
work, VSIs would be protected from liability under this test (unless, of
course, the original copyright owner asked the VSI to remove the
copyrighted file). This would allow "mashers" and the like to continue
posting creative new files on VSIs, without the VSIs being subject to
copyright infringement liability.
In short, although this solution is perhaps stricter on VSIs
than § 512(c), it better balances the interests of copyright owners and
VSIs in the long run. Currently, it is easy to post copyrighted material
on VSIs and for VSIs to acquire the revenue associated with such
postings through advertising fees. The money is flowing in the wrong
direction, as the VSI receives the revenue instead of the copyright
owner. This solution attempts to redistribute responsibility between
VSIs and copyright owners by forcing VSIs to police themselves or risk
liability so that they are better incentivized to contact copyright
owners and create licensing agreements with them. Although this
solution could result in VSIs charging users to fund the licensing fees,
most users probably would be willing to pay a small amount to access
204. Note, however, that there exists a "plausible argument" that infringers of "orphan"
books should be free from liability via fair use defense. Id.
205. Wendy J. Gordon, Render Copyright Unto Caesar: On Taking Incentives Seriously, 71 U.
CHI. L. REV. 75, 90 (2004).
206. Id.
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copyrighted materials legally (think iTunes), and a two-tier system
could be established that would allow free access to home videos
posted by users while charging to view copyrighted material.
Ultimately, this solution would better align interests and would
support the main goals of copyright law: to spur creativity and to
protect copyrighted work from unauthorized use.
V. THE FUTURE OF YoUTUBE
At its current heading, YouTube, The Digital Titanic, is
drifting towards an iceberg and will soon be leaving the placid safe
harbor of the DMCA and entering the rocky seas of copyright liability.
Although it remains unclear whether YouTube and other VSIs
ultimately would be liable for copyright infringement as they
currently operate, their potential liability should persuade VSls to
take present action to protect themselves against million-or-billion-
dollar civil damages. The biggest battles will be fought over whether
VSIs, as they currently exist, receive a direct financial benefit from
copyrighted materials and whether they have the right and ability to
control what their users post. It is unclear how much protection
Congress sought to afford vicarious infringers when it codified these
requirements in § 512(c) of the DMCA.
Assuming that litigation against VSIs is successful, society at
large likely will not be better off. Legal liability would effectively
drown a great source of American creativity and information sharing.
Consequently, Congress should adopt a new two-part test that
requires VSIs to take more responsibility for the files their users post,
but still provides ample protection for these VSIs if rare, derivative, or
skillfully hidden files still manage to find their way onto VSIs' servers.
This helps correct the "money flow" problem currently plaguing this
market area and will better distribute the wealth garnered by artists'
creative labor.
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